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8.  Criminalizing rape and sexual 
violence as methods of warfare
Ludovica Poli
I.  INTRODUCTION
Although national codes have historically prohibited rape, for a long 
time States failed to prosecute it as a war crime. Rape was often con-
doned and seen as a private act, committed by indecent soldiers who went 
unpunished.
The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and for Rwanda (ICTR) made significant progress in this respect and 
filled some critical gaps in the law. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed that the prohibition of rape and other forms 
of sexual violence constitutes a norm of customary international law, 
applicable in both international and internal armed conflicts1� Prior to the 
1990s and the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR rape was considered 
a by-product of war2; now, however, sex crimes are correctly considered 
key strategies of war designed to inflict pain and terror on or even to wipe 
out entire communities�
This chapter evaluates the criminalization of rape and other forms 
of sexual violence as violations of IHL. The prosecution of sex crimes 
as war crimes is one of the foremost accomplishments of international 
criminal law and a great step towards repressing the unlawful conduct of 
hostilities�
1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2005) vol I, 323–7; vol II, 2190–225.
2 Rhonda Copelon, ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes 
against Women into International Criminal Law’ (2000) 46 McGill ILJ 217, 220.
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II.  THE PROHIBITION OF RAPE UNDER IHL: 
A CRIME AGAINST WOMEN, MEN AND 
COMMUNITIES
Both women and men can be victims of sexual offences during armed con-
flicts, however the numbers affirm that a majority of the victims of rape 
are women (and girls)3�
In ancient times, rape constituted a crime against property during 
peacetime but was considered acceptable behavior during armed conflicts: 
a legitimate booty or a trophy for the victors4. All women were considered 
men’s property and thus akin to spoils of war since there was no obligation 
to respect the enemy’s property5. Accordingly in the Middle Ages soldiers 
did not necessarily commit rape to terrorize populations but believed 
they earned it as a reward and a memento of the enemy’s defeat6. Over 
time sexual assault against women evolved into a crime against chastity, 
but it was still considered a violation of men’s right to woman’s sexual 
purity and not as an offence against women7. Since sexual violence against 
women was only an affront to men, raping the enemy’s females ‘had a 
salutary military effect’8: aiming to humiliate the adversary and prove the 
victors’ supremacy.
However, rape against a man during an armed conflict was always 
intended to emasculate the victims and deplete their capacity as warriors 
or rulers9�
Occasionally rape was prohibited, as in the Ordinances of War adopted 
by Richard II in 1385 and by Henry V in 141910, but the ban was rarely 
enforced11 and did not apply to cities under siege.
 3 On male rape see Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual Violence against Men in 
Armed Conflict’ (2007) 18 EJIL 253; Dustin A Lewis, ‘Unrecognized Victims: 
Sexual Violence against Men in Conflict Settings under International Law’ (2009) 
27 WisILJ 1.
 4 Kelly D Askin, War Crimes Against Women - Prosecution in International 
War Crimes Tribunals (Nijhoff 1997), 21. 
 5 Catherine N Niarcos, ‘Women,  War, and Rape:  Challenges Facing the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 17 HRQ 649, 659.
 6 Askin, supra fn 4, at 27–8. 
 7 Ibid at 28.
 8 Niarcos, supra fn 5, at 659.
 9 Hilmi M Zawati, ‘Impunity or Immunity: Wartime Male Rape and Sexual 
Torture as a Crime against Humanity’ (2007) 17 Torture 27, 33–4. 
10 Theodor Meron, ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’ 
(1993) 87 AJIL 424–5. 
11 A significant exception is the conviction in 1474 of Peter von Hagenbach 
for, inter alia, acts of rape committed by his soldiers in the town of Breisach.
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The legal protection of women improved during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and IHL instruments progressively prohibited sexual 
assaults. However, IHL was (and still is) completely blind with respect to 
male rape. In fact, rape has been defined in gender-neutral terms only in 
the 1990s, through the ad hoc Tribunals case law.
The 1863 Lieber Code explicitly banned sexual violence under the 
penalty of death (Art 44). This codification was largely based on interna-
tional custom and thus implicitly ‘signifies the firm position of the prohibi-
tion of rape in customary humanitarian law’12�
Nonetheless by the twentieth century the international prohibition of 
sexual violence was largely ignored. The 1864 Geneva Convention and the 
1899 Hague Convention (II) both failed to include an ad hoc provision, 
while Art 46 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention 
(IV) – the duty to respect family honor and rights – was only later inter-
preted as including a prohibition against sexual violence13�
Some decades later, in 1949, Art 27 (2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(GC IV) addressed the issue more explicitly and protected women ‘against 
any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, 
or any other form of indecent assault’. Art 76 (1) of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I (AP I) similarly reiterated the right of women to be free from 
sexual assaults. While Art 27 (2) GC IV applies to civilians in the hands 
of a party to the conflict or under an Occupying Power of which they are 
not nationals, Art 76 (1) AP I protects all the civilians under the power of 
a party to the conflict, including a party’s own population. Therefore AP 
I ‘represents an advance for international humanitarian law . . . , since it 
widens the circle of beneficiaries’14�
Furthermore Additional Protocol II (AP II) expanded the protection of 
women from sexual abuses during an internal armed conflict. Moreover, 
and in furtherance of Art 3 common to the Geneva Conventions (GCs) 
(common Art 3), Art 4 (2)(e) AP II contains the first explicit prohibition 
of rape.
These IHL provisions have been criticized as unsatisfactory because of 
their gender-charged language and of the values they aim to protect. In 
particular, feminist scholars criticized the prevalent reference to protecting 
12 Askin, supra fn 4, at 36.
13 Meron supra fn 10, at 425; Michael Cottier, ‘Article 8 para 2(b)(xxii) Rape 
and Other Forms of Sexual Violence’, in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes Article by 
Article, 2nd ed (Nomos 2008), 431, 433.
14 Françoise Krill, ‘The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian 
Law’ (1985) IRRC 337, 342.
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women in comparison with the scarce explicit prohibitions of rape15� 
They argue that the focus on ‘protection’ bolsters the fallacy that women 
are ‘objects’16 and impedes efforts to unambiguously ban acts of sexual 
violence17. Moreover such language emphasizes ‘the social condition of 
women, rather than the [rights of] women themselves’18�
Scholars also deplored GC IV’s improper qualification of rape as a 
crime against honor rather than as a crime of violence19. The ICRC 
Commentary correctly identified the rationale behind this provision as 
denouncing the outrages and abuses suffered by women and children 
during World War II, however it failed to link this prohibition of rape with 
the right to one’s physical integrity as laid out in the first paragraph of this 
same provision20. Moreover rape was not explicitly mentioned in Art 32 
GC IV, which bans ‘measure[s] of such a character as to cause the physical 
suffering or extermination of protected persons’.
This normative choice advanced concepts such as ‘soiled’ or ‘disgraced’ 
women, which may have fuelled further bias against women and failed to 
adequately characterize the physical and psychological trauma suffered by 
the victims. Furthermore, this missed opportunity to classify rape as an 
assault to one’s physical integrity discouraged the prosecution of sexual vio-
lence: ‘on the scale of wartime violence, rape as a mere injury to honour and 
reputation appears less worthy of prosecution than injuries to the person’21� 
As a matter of fact, Art 147 GC IV does not mention rape or sexual abuse. 
Although it is now clear that sexual violence and rape are considered grave 
breaches of the GCs, the original lacuna indicates that rape was previously 
considered a minor offence: ‘the failure to recognize the violent nature of 
rape is one reason that it has been assigned a  secondary status in IHL’22�
15 On the protection of women under IHL see Charlotte Lindsey, ‘Women 
and War’ (2000) 82 IRRC 561; Judith Gardam, ‘Women and the Law of Armed 
Conflict: Why the Silence?’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 55.
16 Copelon, supra fn 2, at 221.
17 Christine Chinkin, ‘Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International 
Law’ (1994) 5 EJIL 326, 331–2; Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods 
in International Law’ (1999) 93 AJIL 159, 170–2; Judith Gardam & Hilary 
Charlesworth, ‘Protection of Women in Armed Conflict’ (2000) 22 HRQ 148.
18 Adrienne Kalosieh, ‘Consent to Genocide? The ICTY’s Improper Use of 
the Consent Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foca’ (2003) 24 Women’s 
Rights L Rep 121, 122, as quoted by Noëlle N.R. Quénivet, Sexual Offenses in 
Armed Conflict & International Law (Transnational Publishers 2005), 85.
19 Art 27 (2) GC IV.
20 ICRC, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, vol IV 
(1958), 206. 
21 Niarcos, supra fn 5, at 674.
22 Ibid, at 676.
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However, criticism about IHL provisions may be partially abandoned. 
First, the language of Art 27 (2) GC IV and of Art 76 (1) AP I (focusing 
on general protection of women) were complemented by other relevant 
norms. The APs unequivocally prohibited rape (Art 4 (2)(e) AP II) and 
banned ‘any form of indecent assault’ (Art 75 (2)(b) AP I). Furthermore, 
in light of its object and purpose, the GC IV was interpreted to include 
rape: ‘rape is prohibited via the protection formula’23. ICTY case law sup-
ported this approach24. Finally this ‘protection norm’ was interpreted to 
include more than a mere ‘prohibition’; it also created ‘a duty to prevent 
the commission of an act, to take precautionary measures to ensure that 
this right will not be infringed’25�
Secondly, it is indisputable that the qualification of rape as a crime 
against honor does not offer a proper description of the pain suffered by 
the victims. The improvement of gender issues in national and interna-
tional contexts belittled the concept that women’s rights exist insofar they 
are connected to different human rights like family rights. However, the 
mistaken focus on honor and on social groups (and not on women’s rights 
per se) allows one to take into account the long-term effects of rape on the 
community in which the victims live. In addition to the pain suffered by 
the individual victim26, the community suffers consequences of rape as an 
act of war: sexual violence against women and men in wartime destroys 
community ties and interferes with post-conflict reconciliation efforts.
Finally, despite the absence of a clear reference to sexual violence 
under Art 147 GC IV and Art 85 AP I, it is now unanimously recognized 
that rape represents a grave breach of IHL. The ICRC’s Commentary 
explained that ‘inhuman treatment’ under Art 147 had to be read in con-
junction with Art 27 and thus encompassed rape27� At the beginning of 
the 1990s, the ICRC issued an aide memoire clarifying the prohibition of 
rape under the GCs. In particular, it declared that the grave breach of ‘wil-
fully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health’ includes 
rape and any other attack on a woman’s dignity28�
23 Quénivet, supra fn 18, at 93.
24 See for example Prosecutor v Furundžija, ICTY Case No IT-95-17/1T, 
Trial Judgement, 10 December 1998, para 165 (Furundžija Trial Judgement); 
and Prosecutor v Delalić et al, ICTY Case No IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, 16 
November 1998, para 476 (Delalić Trial Judgement). 
25 Quénivet, supra fn 18, at 91.
26 Chinkin, supra fn 17, at 329–30; Sharon A. Healey, ‘Prosecuting Rape 
under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 
21 Brooklyn J Int’l L 327, 339.
27 Supra fn 20, at 598.
28 ICRC, Aide-memoire (1992) para 2, quoted by Patricia Viseurs Seller, ‘The 
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In addition, many States recognized that rape as a grave breach consti-
tutes customary international law and is outlawed by the GCs29� The argu-
ment was also pressed by the Commission of Experts established pursuant 
to Resolution 780 (1992): ‘rape and other sexual assaults constitute “grave 
breaches” as they can be considered to be a form of torture or inhuman 
treatment and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and 
health’30. The ICTY’s case law affirmed this interpretation31. Finally, the 
drafting history of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
its Elements of Crimes (EoC), the States’ views emerged during the negotia-
tions and, to some extent, the last part of Art 8 (2)(b)(xxii)32 demonstrate 
that sexual violence may amount to a grave breach33�
III.  ENFORCING THE LAW: THE PROSECUTION 
OF RAPE AND OTHER SEX CRIMES AS 
METHODS OF WAR
IHL Rules outlawing rape during armed conflicts have existed for a long 
time, but these prohibitions were scarcely enforced34 and one of the main 
Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights 
as Means of Interpretation’ (www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_
Prosecution_of_Sexual_Violence.pdf, accessed 15 February 2013). 
29 Meron mentions a statement made by the US Department of State in 1993 
and some documents containing draft charters for the ICTY, submitted by many 
States to the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council (UNSC) Res 808 
(1993), supra fn 10, at 427.
30 UN Commission of Experts established pursuant to UNSC res 780 (1992), 
Final Report – Annex II: Rape and Sexual Assault: A Legal Study (UN doc 
S/1994/674/Add.2 – vol I, 28 December 1994), para II.
31 See, for example, Furundžija Trial Judgement, para 165 fn 192; Prosecutor 
v Kvočka et al, ICTY Case No IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Judgement, 2 November 
2001, para 166 fn 321 (Kvočka Trial Judgement). In Tadić an episode of rape was 
described as a grave breach of the GCs: Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Case No IT-94-
1-I, Second Amended Indictment, 14 December 1995.
32 Art 8 (2)(b)(xxii) lists, under ‘other serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in international armed conflict’, rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, ‘or any other form of 
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions’. 
While these sex crimes are not considered under sub-para (a), dedicated to the 
grave breaches of the GCs, the wording ‘also constituting a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions’, according to Cottier, implies that the five specific sex crimes 
amount, in any event, to grave breaches. Cottier, supra fn 13, at 453.
33 Cottier, supra fn 13, at 432 fn 789.
34 On the challenges of the prosecution of sex crimes see Morten Bergsmo, 
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reasons is most likely to be found in the failure to identify its ‘public’ 
dimension35�
Despite the huge sectors of the population affected, rapes were consid-
ered ‘private’ acts committed by undisciplined soldiers or regrettable acts of 
individual combatants in situations of generalized violence. The use of rape 
and sexual violence as a strategy of fighting armed conflicts was completely 
overlooked; sexual violence is a cheap, easy method of combat, aimed at 
injuring victims, destabilizing families and undermining social ties�
A.  Rape at the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo
Despite the use of rape as a tool of conquest or domination in most of the 
conflicts of the twentieth century36, the prosecution of rape as a war crime 
has been largely unsatisfactory.
One such failure was omitting such crimes from the jurisdiction of the 
International Military Tribunals (IMTs) of Nuremberg and Tokyo. The 
Charters of both Tribunals failed to outlaw rape and enforced prostitu-
tion even though both crimes were considered violations of the laws or 
customs of war under the Responsibility Commission’s Report of the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference37. Nonetheless the Tokyo Tribunal38 and the US 
Military Commission in Manila39 convicted the defendants for rape as a 
violation of the laws or customs of war.
Rape as a crime against humanity was outlawed by Control Council 
Law Number 1040, which provided the basis for the trial of ‘lesser’ war 
crimes committed in the occupied areas. However, despite the large 
number of reported rapes, sex crimes were not prosecuted41�
Alf Butenschøn Skre and Elisabeth J Wood (eds), Understanding and Proving 
International Sex Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012).
35 Danise Aydelott, ‘Mass Rape During War, Prosecuting Bosnian Rapist 
under International Law’ (1993) 8 Emory ILR 585, 587–8; Justin Wagner, ‘The 
Systematic Use of Rape as a Tool of War in Darfur: A Blueprint for International 
War Crimes Prosecutions’ (2005–2006) 37 Geo JIL 193, 212.
36 Aydelott, supra fn 35, at 588–96.
37 Askin, supra fn 4, at 42–3.
38 In the cases against Foreign Minister Hirota and General Matsui: IMT for 
the Far East, Judgement of 12 November 1948, in John Pritchard and Sonia M. 
Zaide (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Garland 1981), vol 22, 788–93, 814–16.
39 US Military Commission, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, in Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals. Selected and Prepared by the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission (HMSO 1948), vol IV, 35.
40 Control Council Law No 10, Art II(c) lists rape as a crime against humanity. 
41 Askin, supra fn 4, at 125 fn 434. 
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B.  The Contribution of the Jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR
The use of rape as a wartime strategy became apparent in the 1990s: the 
atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda provided a 
glimpse into the strategized nature of the commission of sex crimes during 
armed conflict and an incentive for their prosecutions. The widespread 
commission of sex crimes in these contexts clarified that indecent assaults 
were used as a policy of warfare and even as an means of ethnic cleansing 
or genocide. In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda rapes and sex crimes 
‘were centrally planned, systematic, and [represented] an attempt to anni-
hilate an entire ethnic group’42�
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, the use of rape as a weapon 
of war (mainly against Muslims and Croats) was evident43. Many victims 
and some Serb deserters reported that Serb officers ordered the commit-
ting of sex crimes with the intent of forcing people to leave their region44� 
Such instructions confirm the existence of a generalized combat strategy: 
‘when employed, supervised or incited by the architects of armed conflict, 
the phenomenon is not “rape out of control”, but “rape under orders” ’45�
The ‘linkage between the prevalence of sexual violence and the politi-
cal agenda behind identity-based conflict’ was further illuminated by 
the ICTR, which recognized that ‘sexual violence and military objectives 
could be one and the same’46. By committing crimes of sexual violence 
in public and in the presence of family members, the perpetrators demon-
strated that they were aware of the devastating impact of inflicting sexual 
violence�
Both the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes list rape as a crime against 
humanity (Art 5 ICTY Statute and Art 3 ICTR Statute), but only the 
latter explicitly lists rape under the category of war crimes (Art 4 ICTR 
Statute).
The ICTY largely contributed to the identification of rape as a violation 
42 Wagner, supra fn 35, at 215.
43 Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘Radical Rules: The Effects of Evidential and 
Procedural Rules on the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War’ (1997) 60 Alb LR 
883.
44 Aydelott, supra fn 35, at 624–5.
45 Letitia Anderson, ‘Politics by Other Means: When Does Sexual Violence 
Threaten International Peace and Security?’ (2010) INPE 244, 252. On the oppor-
tunity to prosecute high officials, see Christin B Coan, ‘Rethinking the Spoils of 
War: Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ (2000) 26 NCJ Int’l & Com Reg 183, 203–5. 
46 Jennifer Park, ‘Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War in International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 1 Int’l Pub Pol Rev 13, 17.
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of the laws or customs of war while the ICTR (with few exceptions47) clas-
sified rape as an act of genocide48 or as a crime against humanity49�
In Tadić the accused was charged with a grave breach of the GCs, a 
violation of the laws or customs of war and a crime against humanity for 
forced sexual intercourse with a female prisoner (counts 2–4). The indict-
ment also alleged that the accused forced two prisoners to commit oral 
sexual acts on a third detainee and to sexually mutilate him: these acts 
were classed as grave breaches, violations of the laws or customs of war 
and crimes against humanity (counts 5–11). Unfortunately the charges 
contained in counts 2–4 were withdrawn during the trial, because the main 
witness refused to testify. Tadić, however, was convicted for aiding and 
abetting the sexual mutilation as a violation of the laws or customs of war 
(cruel treatment) and as a crime against humanity (inhumane act)50�
In the ICTY decisions, rape was often considered in connection with 
torture. In many cases, acts of sexual violence were committed with the 
intention of obtaining information from the victims and thus met the 
threshold of torture. Initially, the Prosecutor charged rape only as a 
form of torture and hesitated to prosecute rape as such as a violation of 
IHL.
In the Delalić case, the Trial Chamber determined when rape may con-
stitute torture. The indictment charged one accused with torture for the 
rape of two women both as a grave breach (counts 18 and 21) and as a 
violation of the laws or customs of war (counts 19 and 22)51� The Court 
stated that whenever rape was committed for an intended prohibited 
purpose it shall constitute torture52 and found the accused guilty for the 
47 Despite the possibility of charging rape as a violation of the laws or customs 
of war proving the nexus between the armed conflict and the sex crimes committed 
remains difficult� Semanza is one of the few cases where the accused was found 
guilty of rape as a serious  violation of common Art 3 and AP II, Prosecutor v 
Semanza, ICTR Case No ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003 (Semanza 
Trial Judgement).
48 See in particular Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR Case No ICTR-96-4-T, Trial 
Judgement, 2 September 1998 (Akayesu Trial Judgement).
49 On the results achieved by the ICTY and ICTR see Kelly D Askin, 
‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International 
Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’ (2003) 21 Berkeley JIL 288.
50 Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Case No IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgement and 
Opinion, 7 May 1997, paras 722–30. Kelly D Askin, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions 
and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status’ (1999) 
93 AJIL 97, 101.
51 Prosecutor v Delalić et al, ICTY Case No ICTY IT-96-21, Indictment, 9 
March 1996 (Delalić Indictment). 
52 Delalić Trial Judgement, paras 494–6.
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same conduct as a grave breach and as a violation of the laws or customs 
of war53�
The Prosecutor also charged three accused under their position as supe-
riors with grave breaches (inhumane treatments) and violations of the laws 
or customs of war (cruel treatments) for different inhumane acts includ-
ing forcing two brothers to commit fellatio on each other (counts 44 and 
4554). The Delalić Trial Chamber recognized in particular that this last 
episode represented an inhuman act and stated that it ‘could constitute 
rape for which liability could have been found, if pleaded in the appropri-
ate manner’55. The Trial Chamber left the door open for classifying as 
rape situations in which the perpetrator does not take active part in the 
sexual abuse but forces other people to perform sex in his presence or in 
public.
The Furundžija case better contextualized such instances of rape. The 
facts were similar to the Delalić case: the victim was raped, sexually 
assaulted and subjected to many other forms of ill treatment during an 
interrogation. Rape was charged both as a form of torture (count 13), and 
as an outrage upon personal dignity including rape (count 14), under Art 
3 ICTY Statute. The Prosecutor alleged these acts constituted torture as 
recognized under common Art 356 and an outrage upon personal dignity, 
in particular rape, as prohibited by Art 4 (2)(e) AP II57. The accused was 
found guilty of co-perpetrating torture and aiding and abetting outrages 
upon personal dignity including rape58. Similarly in the Kunarac case59 
intra-article 3 cumulative convictions for torture and rape were issued by 
the Trial Chamber and upheld by the Appeals Chamber60�
53 The Appeals Chamber later dismissed the charges of violations of the laws 
or customs of war upholding the accused’s appeal against cumulative convictions 
based on the same acts� Prosecutor v Delalić et al, ICTY Case No IT-96-21-A, 
Appeal Judgement, 20 February 2001, para 425.
54 Delalić Indictment�
55 Delalić Trial Judgement, para 1066.
56 Furundžija Trial Judgement, para 43.
57 Ibid, para 44.
58 Ibid, paras 269 and 275.
59 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, ICTY Case No IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 
Trial Judgement, 22 February 2001 (Kunarac Trial Judgement). For a comment on 
the case, see Christopher Scott Maravilla, ‘Rape as a War Crime: The Implications 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Decision in 
Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovač, & Vuković on International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2000–2001) 13 Fla JIL 321.
60 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, ICTY Case No IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, 
Appeal Judgement, 12 June 2002, paras 188–96 (Kunarac Appeal Judgement). All 
grounds of appeal were rejected.
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The way in which sexual violence is qualified in the indictment may 
have relevant consequences. For example in the Kvočka case, the indict-
ment charged all of the accused with persecution for various acts including 
sexual assault and rape61. Additionally acts of rape were considered per se 
with reference to one accused, because of his proved personal involvement 
in many episodes of rape committed against identified victims. The indict-
ment (unlike those in Furundžija, Kunarac and Haradinaj et al62) charged 
the accused of ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ without any explicit refer-
ence to rape. Because of this lack of qualification, the Trial Chamber con-
sidered the episodes of rape to be subsumed within the torture conviction 
for acts of sexual violence63. According to the Trial Chamber:
it is permissible to enter convictions for rape and torture based on the same acts 
when elements of both crimes have been satisfied [but] it is not permissible . . . 
to enter multiple convictions for torture and outrages upon personal dignity, as 
torture is the more distinct crime64� 
The Furundžija and Kunarac65 cases clarified that rape and sexual violence 
are prohibited during armed conflict. These cases recognized rape as a 
war crime per se in situations where rape may have been seen as ‘just’ one 
of the available means of inflicting torture� The Kunarac judgement was 
outstanding in this perspective because the Trial Chamber considered rape 
as a violation of the laws or customs of war per se and not as an outrage 
against dignity, as it was charged in Furundžija. On the other hand, the 
prosecution of rape as a form of genocide, torture or persecution is neces-
sary and appropriate to describe the overall framework in which those 
violent acts take place and the final aim of the perpetrators.
In conclusion, although the number of indictments that charged rape 
‘does not accurately reflect the high incidence of sex crimes during the 
war’66, the ad hoc Tribunals, in particular the ICTY greatly contributed 
61 Prosecutor v Kvocka et al, ICTY Case No IT-98-30/1, Amended Indictment, 
26 October 2000, Counts 1–3.
62 Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al, ICTY Case No IT-04-84-T, Fourth Amended 
Indictment, 16 October 2007.
63 Kvocka Trial Judgement, para 579. 
64 Ibid, para 577.
65 Peggy Kuo, ‘Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International 
Tribunal’ (2002) 34 Case W Res J Int’l L 305, 314.
66 Simon Jennings,  ‘Lukić Trial Ruling provokes Outcry’ (Institute for War 
and Peace Reporting, 15 August 2008, at http://iwpr.net/report-news/lukic-trial-
ruling-provokes-outcry, accessed 15 February 2013). In the case against Milan 
and Sredoje Lukić the Prosecutor decided not to amend the indictment to add sex 
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to the undeniable prohibition of different forms of sexual violence as 
methods of war.
C.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL): the Relevance of Sexual 
Slavery and Forced Marriages as Combat Methods
The SCSL Statute listed rape and other forms of sexual violence under the 
categories of crimes against humanity (Art 2) and violations of common 
Art 3 as ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ (Art 3). Furthermore Art 5 of 
the statute extended the Court’s jurisdiction to include crimes under Sierra 
Leonean law, including offences relating to the abuse of girls.
SCSL jurisprudence significantly contributed to the identification of 
sexual slavery and forced marriage as violations of the laws or customs 
of war. Although forced marriages are not considered predominantly sex 
crimes, their commission was largely connected with other forms of sexual 
assault (including forced pregnancy).
In the case against Brima, Kamara and Kanu, the Trial Chamber 
convicted three members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), inter alia, for rape as a crime against humanity and sexual slavery 
as a war crime. The Trial Chamber used, by analogy, the category of sexual 
slavery to condemn forced marriages or the abduction of girls forced to 
become ‘bush-wives’ of rebels and soldiers. The victims of forced marriages 
were at their ‘husband’s’ disposal and forced to perform different activi-
ties connected to the imposed marital status. These tasks included regular 
sexual intercourse and a variety of domestic assignments. Despite also con-
taining elements that were non-sexual in nature, the Trial Chamber rejected 
the argument that the crime of forced marriage was independent from the 
crime of sexual slavery67. This inclusion of forced marriages within the 
category of sexual slavery was later overturned by the Appeals Chamber, 
which considered that forced marriage was not predominantly a sexual 
crime68 and determined that these incidents constituted a distinct crime 
against humanity (inhumane act) prohibited by Art 2 (i) SCSL Statute.
The Sesay Trial Judgement affirmed the distinction between sexual 
crimes charges for reasons of expediency. 
67 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No SCSL-04-16-T, Trial 
Judgement, 20 June 2007, para 704.
68 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeal 
Judgement, 22 February 2008, para 195 (Brima Appeal Judgement). See Micaela 
Frulli, ‘Advancing International Criminal Law – The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone Recognizes Forced Marriage as a New Crime against Humanity?’ (2008) 6 
JICJ 1033.
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slavery and forced marriage. In particular, it identified the ‘forced conjugal 
association based on exclusivity between the perpetrator and victim’ as the 
distinct element between the two crimes69 and stressed how this imposed 
marital status ‘carried with it a lasting social stigma which hampers [the 
victims’] recovery and reintegration into society’70. Once again, forced 
marriage was considered to constitute a crime against humanity distinct 
from the outlawed crime of sexual slavery. Moreover, the Sesay Trial 
Chamber found that the acts of rape, sexual slavery and ‘forced marriage’, 
constituting outrages upon personal dignity, also constituted violations 
of common Art 3 and AP II. This advanced the criminalization of sexual 
and other related crimes as unlawful methods of warfare. While the Brima 
Appeals Chamber considered that the ‘society’s disapproval of the force-
ful abduction and use of women and girls as forced conjugal partners’ was 
adequately reflected by the conviction for a crime against humanity71, the 
Sesay Trial Judgement suggested that, once the nexus between the crimes 
committed and the conflict was established, it was also appropriate to 
classify them as war crimes. This recognition of the concurrent commis-
sion of specific offences was significant because it was ‘designed to draw 
attention to serious crimes that have been historically overlooked and to 
recognize the particular nature of sexual violence that has been used, often 
with impunity, as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate and instil fear in 
victims, their families and communities during armed conflict’72�
The Sesay case recognized that rape and other sexual violence also 
constitute acts of terrorism, listed in the SCSL Statute as violations of 
common Art 3 and AP II73� The Trial Chamber characterized sex crimes 
committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) as strictly linked to 
its larger combat strategy. In particular, the RUF implemented a ‘calcu-
lated and concerted pattern’ of sexual violence, not only against women, 
but also against men ‘of all ages’74 in order to ‘effectively [disempower] the 
civilian population, (. . .) ha[ve] a direct effect of instilling fear on entire 
communities’75 and distort ‘cultural values and relationships which held 
the societies together’76�
69 Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon, Gbao, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgement, 
2 March 2009, para 2307 (Sesay Trial Judgement).
70 Ibid, para 1296.
71 Brima Appeal Judgement, para 203.
72 Sesay Trial Judgement, para 156.
73 Ibid, paras 1347–9.
74 Ibid, para 1347.
75 Ibid, para 1348.
76 Ibid, para 1349.
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The Taylor Trial Judgement77 also considered sex crimes, including 
sexual slavery to be key elements of the AFRC/RUF ’s strategy to terror-
ize the civilian population and force it into submission. Notably, The Trial 
Chamber diverged from its initial Brima formulation according to which 
sexual slavery could not constitute the crime of terrorizing the civilian 
population, because it had not been committed with the intent to cause 
fear among civilians, but instead ‘to take advantage of the spoils of war, by 
treating women as property and using them to satisfy their sexual desires 
and to fulfill other conjugal needs’78�
IV.  THE ICC STATUTE: A COMPLETE LIST OF 
SEXUAL WAR CRIMES
The inclusion of an explicit list of sex crimes under Art 8 ICC Statute rep-
resents the convergence of the normative evolution criminalizing sexual 
violence as war crimes and embodies the great progress made in protecting 
people during armed conflict: both women and men, given the gender-
neutral terms of the relevant provisions79�
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity 
are enumerated as war crimes outlawed both in international and internal 
conflicts. This was to some extent ‘a creative legislating exercise’80 because 
at the time rape had mainly been considered under the chapeau of ‘out-
rages upon personal dignity’ and some of the other acts had never been 
previously considered in any treaty81�
Sex crimes are no longer simply subsumed under outrages upon per-
sonal dignity: given that ‘the ICC represents the normative benchmark of 
international criminal law’, it codified the illegality of numerous acts of 
sexual violence that had been erroneously and historically denied82�
In two cases currently pending before the ICC (Prosecutor v Katanga and 
77 Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No SCSL-03-1-T, Trial Judgement Summary, 26 
April 2012, paras 56–7.
78 Brima Appeals Judgement, para 1459.
79 With the sole exception of ‘forced pregnancy’.
80 Cottier, supra fn 13, at 435.
81 Michael Bothe, ‘War Crimes’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John 
R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (OUP 2002), vol 1, 414–6, 422.
82 Richard J Goldstone, ‘Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime’ (2002) 34 Case 
W Res J Int’l L 277, 285.
150 War crimes and the conduct of hostilities
Chui and Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo)83, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed 
charges of rape as a war crime. In Katanga and Chui, it also confirmed the 
charges of sexual slavery with reference to instances of forced marriage84�
V.  THE DEFINITION OF RAPE AND ITS SPECIFIC 
FEATURES DURING ARMED CONFLICTS
The ad hoc Tribunals defined rape as an international crime in partially 
varying terms.
The first discrepancy concerns the description of the violence as pre-
dominately general/conceptual at the ICTR85, opposed to the specific/
mechanical explanation applied at the ICTY86. However, as the ICTR 
Trial Chamber has pointed out in Muhimana:
the Akayesu [ie conceptual] definition and the Kunarac elements [ie mechanical 
description] are not incompatible or substantially different in their application. 
Whereas Akayesu referred broadly to a ‘physical invasion of a sexual nature’, 
Kunarac went on to articulate the parameters of what would constitute a physi-
cal invasion of a sexual nature amounting to rape87�
The second difference concerns the explicit reference to a lack of consent 
by the victim versus reference to a general situation of coercion. This 
implies consequences in terms of the burden of proof: if non-consent is 
an element of the crime, the Prosecutor must prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that the victim did not consent to the conduct in question other-
wise, if the victim’s consent is just a possible affirmative defence, then the 
accused must prove that the victim consented.
83 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No ICC-
01/04-01/07, PTC Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008 
(Katanga Decision); Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No ICC-01/05-
01/08, PTC Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009.
84 Katanga Decision, paras 343–4, 348–9.
85 Referring to a general ‘physical invasion of sexual nature’ see Akayesu, 
Trial Judgement, para 688; Prosecutor v Musema, Case No ICTR-96-13-T, Trial 
Judgement, 27 January 2000, para 220–9; Prosecutor v Niyitegeka, Case No ICTR-
96-14-T, Trial Judgement, 16 May 2003, para 456. Compare to Semanza Trial 
Judgement, paras 344–6 and Prosecutor v Kajelijeli, Case No ICTR-98-44A-T, 
Trial Judgement, 1 December 2003, paras 910–16.
86 Listing acts constituting a ‘physical invasion of sexual nature’: see 
Furundžija Trial Judgement, para 185; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para 437. 
87 Prosecutor v Muhimana, case No ICTR-95-1B-T, Trial Judgement, 28 
April 2005, para 550.
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This focus on the absence of the victim’s consent was stressed for the 
first time in the Kunarac Trial Judgement, which focused on the protec-
tion of the victim’s sexual autonomy and pointed out that, in addition to 
force and coercion other circumstances may give rise to classifying sexual 
intercourse as an act of violence88�
Nonetheless, others contend that the reference to a generic situation of 
coercion, rather than to the element of non-consent is preferable because 
instead of focusing on the victim’s reaction, ‘[s]uch an approach takes 
into account the realities of how rape is used as a weapon of war’89� 
Rape during warfare is distinct from ‘merely’ undesired sex: ‘it seems 
more appropriate to speak of “sexualized violence” which, in addition to 
seriously infringing upon sexual autonomy, violates the victim’s physical 
well-being’90�
A review of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals shows that atten-
tion has always been paid to the surrounding circumstances in which 
episodes of rape were committed. For example, the Appeals Chamber in 
the Kunarac case affirmed that the absence of consent is a condicio sine qua 
non of rape and eventually concluded that the coercive circumstances of 
the case negated any possibility of genuine consent91. The ICTR Appeals 
Chamber agreed stating that ‘the Prosecutor can prove non-consent 
beyond reasonable doubt by proving the existence of coercive circum-
stances under which meaningful consent is not possible’92. Finally, the 
ICC EoC describe this element in broad terms mentioning the use and 
threat of use of force against the victim or a third person, the recourse to 
88 Kunarac Trial Judgement, para 457. 
89 Thekla Hansen-Young, ‘Defining Rape: A Means to Achieve Justice in the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2005) 6 Chi JIL 479, 489. See also Catharine A 
MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu’ (2006) 44 
Col JTL 940, 956.
90 Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson, ‘Genuine Consent to Sexual 
Violence under International Criminal Law’ (2007) 101 AJIL 121, 127. In his dis-
senting opinion attached to the Appeal judgement in the case against Rukundo, 
Judge Pocar points out the need to distinguish between the perpetrator’s ‘motive’ 
and ‘intent’ and recalls the Kunarac Appeal Judgement at para 153: ‘even if the per-
petrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does 
not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering 
is a likely and logical, consequence of his conduct’: Prosecutor v Rukundo, Case 
No ICTR-2001-70-A, Appeal Judgement, 20 October 2010, Partially Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Pocar, para 10.
91 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, paras 129–32.
92 Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, Case No ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgement, 7 
July 2006, para 155. 
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a situation of coercion (‘such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power’), the taking 
advantage of a coercive environment and situations in which the victim is 
unable of giving genuine consent (because affected by natural, induced or 
age related incapacity)93�
In conclusion, whenever rape is committed as a war crime, a crime 
against humanity or an act of genocide, ‘the international element [of such 
crimes] requires the establishment of circumstances that are inherently 
coercive and make the question of consent redundant’94�
VI.  CONCLUSION: RAPE IN WAR CONSTITUTES 
A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 
SECURITY
This analysis of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL’s case law has revealed how 
frequently rape and other sex crimes have been used as a means of warfare 
in recent armed conflicts. While sexual violence always occurred during 
war, in the 1990s the recourse to rape as a method of warfare was wide-
spread and produced extremely cruel episodes of violence.
The scope and impact of such a practice have been recognized by the 
international tribunals, which strongly contributed to the classification of 
rape both as a separate violation of IHL and as an underlying offence of 
other international crimes�
The UNSC expressed its concern for the continuation of such a practice, 
by adopting various resolutions95 and a Special Representative on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict was appointed96�
Most significantly, the UNSC acknowledged that the widespread and 
systematic use of sex crimes as methods of war constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security because it aims to distort or destroy the 
victims’ social context, and thus exacerbates the conflict and impedes 
the peace and reconciliation process. Impunity for sex crimes committed 
during the conflict may ‘feed the cycle of conflict’97, and contribute to the 
spread of post-conflict sexual violence. The criminalization of sexual vio-
lence as method of war is a significant contribution towards the possible 
deterrence of these most heinous of crimes that plague our times.
93 EoC, Arts 7 (1)(g)-1, §2; 8 (2)(b)(xxii)-1, §2; 8 (2)(e)(vi)-1, §2.
94 Schomburg and Peterson, supra fn 90, at 128.
95 S/RES/1325; S/RES/1820; S/RES/1888.
96 UN doc SG/A/1220.
97 Anderson, supra fn 45, at 253.
